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Supreme Court Recognizes
(a Derivative) Right to Access
Information
Ryder L. Gilliland*

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada released its longawaited decision in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security).1 The unanimous judgment of the Court, cowritten by McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., is significant in that it recognizes, for the first time in Canada, that section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 protects a right to access government
information. Prior to the Criminal Lawyers decision, courts, including
the courts below, had repeatedly rejected the notion of a constitutional
right to access government information, despite widespread recognition
by courts and legislators of the central role access to government information plays in fostering democracy. In a short and direct judgment, the
Court has swept away the analytical barriers that stood in the way of the
constitutionalization of a right of access. The decision represents a sea
change from an analytical perspective.
It remains to be seen, however, what impact the Criminal Lawyers
decision will have from practical perspective. The limited guidance provided by the Court is that there is a right to access information where it is
“necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of public interest”.3 The word “meaningful”, a new addition to the matrix of section
2(b) Charter analysis, leaves uncertainty respecting when a right to access information can be invoked. The upshot of the Court’s parsimonious
reasons is that the scope of the right of access will be decided in future
*
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. Along with his partner Paul Schabas, Mr.
Gilliland was counsel for interveners in the Criminal Lawyers case.
1
[2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
Id., at para. 31.
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cases, the focus of which will no doubt be on the extent to which the
words “necessary” and “meaningful” should limit the right of access.
The view developed in this paper is that having established a toehold
in Canadian law, the scope of the right of access will necessarily expand
over time. This is so for two principal reasons. First, the freedom expression right from which the right of access derives has always been very
broadly construed. A narrow construction of the words “necessary” and
“meaningful” is inconsistent with the approach to section 2(b) developed
since Ford.4 Second, as access to information and freedom of expression
are recognized as fundamental to democracy, undue constraint of either
right is inconsistent with modern national and international societal values. There is a clear trend in the case law towards increased openness
and transparency.

II. BACKGROUND
In 1983 Graham Court and Denis Monahan were charged with participating in the murder of Domenic Racco in an alleged “mob hit”.
Fourteen years later, Glithero J. of the Ontario Superior Court stayed the
charges on the basis of abusive conduct by police and prosecutors. His
judgment was a scathing indictment of the police and Crown. As an example:
As previously indicated, I have found many instances of abusive
conduct by state officials, involving deliberate non-disclosure,
deliberate editing of useful information, negligent breach of the duty to
maintain original evidence, improper cross-examination and jury
addresses during the first trial. That prejudice is completed. The
improper cross-examinations and jury address would not be repeated at
a new trial and the completed prejudice with respect to those issues
would not therefore be perpetuated in a new trial. The effects or
prejudice caused by the abusive conduct in systematic non-disclosure,
deliberate revision of materials so as to exclude useful information to
the defence, and the unexplained loss, or breach of the duty to preserve,
of so much original evidence would be perpetuated through a future
trial in that the defence cannot be put back into the position they would
originally have been, and which in my view they were entitled to
maintain throughout the trial process. That evidence is gone, either
entirely or to the extent of severely diminishing the utility of the
evidence, and the prejudice thereby occasioned has only been
4

Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.).
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exaggerated by the passage of time since the 1991 trial and prior to the
5
belated disclosure of this information in 1996.

Justice Glithero’s criticism of the conduct of state officials prompted
a review by the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) of the investigation
and subsequent prosecution. Nine months later, the OPP issued a terse
press release, in which it stated that it had found “no misconduct” on the
part of state officials and “no evidence” that they systematically suppressed vital evidence in the Racco case.
In light of the stark contrast between Glithero J.’s judgment and the
OPP press release, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (“the CLA” or
“the Association”) submitted a request under the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act6 for the records underlying the OPP’s investigation. In particular, the CLA sought a 318-page police report, an
internal memorandum, and a letter, all relating to the OPP investigation.
The Ministry of the Solicitor General, now the Ministry of Public
Safety and Security (“the Ministry”), denied the CLA’s FIPPA request on
the basis that the records were exempted from disclosure under sections
14, 19, and 21 of FIPPA, which pertain to law enforcement records,
solicitor-client privilege and personal privacy, respectively. On appeal,
the Office of Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario upheld
the non-disclosure.
The CLA appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing that its freedom
of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter had been infringed. In
particular, the Association argued that section 23 of FIPPA, which is the
public interest override provision of the Act, was unconstitutional because although it allows the Minister to invoke the public interest to
grant access to documents that are exempted from disclosure under the
Act, it does not apply to records exempted under the law enforcement
(section 14) or solicitor-client (section 19) privilege exemptions. The
Divisional Court rejected this argument centrally on the basis that there
was no constitutional “right to know”.7
Although a majority of the Court of Appeal (Laforme and
MacFarland JJ.A.) found that there had been a section 2(b) violation, it
did so without finding that there is a free-standing right to access government information under section 2(b) of the Charter. Instead, it found
5

R. v. Court, [1997] O.J. No. 3450, 36 O.R. (3d) 263, at para. 130 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 [hereinafter “FIPPA”].
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security), [2004] O.J.
No. 1214, 237 D.L.R. (4th) 525, at para. 34 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “CLA Trial Decision”].
6
7
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that having created a public interest override, the legislature was obliged
to extend it to all provisions.8 In other words, the section 2(b) right in this
case was generated from within the four corners of the Act. In a strong
dissent, Juriansz J.A. tackled head on the question of whether there was a
right of access under section 2(b) of the Charter, concluding that no such
right existed.9
A central tension in the Divisional Court judgment, as well as in the
majority and minority decisions in the Court of Appeal, was on the distinction between rights and freedoms. In particular, the courts below had
difficulty reconciling the CLA’s position with the principle, first articulated by the Court in Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),10 that
section 2 of the Charter does not, as a general rule, impose positive obligations on government.

III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court dealt summarily with cases such as Haig by
stating as follows:
The courts below were divided on whether the analysis should follow
the model adopted in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001
SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. In their argument before this Court,
some of the parties also placed reliance on Dunmore and on this
Court’s subsequent decision in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 673. In our view, nothing would be gained by furthering this
debate. Rather, it is our view that the question of access to government
information is best approached by building on the methodology set in
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at
pp. 967-68, and in Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005
11
SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141.

Having set aside the analytical framework that was developed to
limit the circumstances in which positive obligations could be imposed
on government under section 2(b) of the Charter, the Court proceeded to
apply the Irwin Toy framework as follows:
8

[2007] O.J. No. 2038, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.).
Id., at paras. 99-167.
[1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”]. See also Native
Women’s Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Siemens
v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 69, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.); Delisle v. Canada
(Deputy Attorney General) (a s. 2(d) case), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.).
11
Criminal Lawyers, supra, note 1, at para. 31.
9

10
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The Irwin Toy framework involves three inquiries: (1) Does the
activity in question have expressive content, thereby bringing it within
the reach of s. 2(b)? (2) Is there something in the method or location of
that expression that would remove that protection? (3) If the activity is
protected, does the state action infringe that protection, either in
purpose or effect? These steps were developed in Montréal (City) (at
para. 56) in the context of expressive activities, but the principles
animating them equally apply to determining whether s. 2(b) requires
the production of government documents.
This leads us to more detailed comments on the scope of s. 2(b)
protection where the issue is access to documents in government hands.
To demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such
documents, the claimant must establish that the denial of access
effectively precludes meaningful commentary. If the claimant can show
this, there is a prima facie case for the production of the documents in
question. But even if this prima facie case is established, the claim may
be defeated by factors that remove s. 2(b) protection, e.g. if the
documents sought are protected by privilege or if production of the
documents would interfere with the proper functioning of the
governmental institution in question. If the claim survives this second
step, then the claimant establishes that s. 2(b) is engaged. The only
remaining question is whether the government action infringes that
12
protection.

The Court proceeded to apply this test in reverse order, finding first
that the failure to extend the public override exemption to the law enforcement and privilege provisions of the Act would not infringe section
2(b) protection. The basis for this conclusion was that the public override
provision adds very little to the Act, as under sections 14 and 19 the head
already has discretion as to whether or not to apply an exemption.13 As
the Court summarized:
We conclude that the CLA has failed to establish that the
inapplicability of the s. 23 public interest override significantly impairs
its ability to obtain the documents it seeks. Sections 14 and 19 already
incorporate, by necessity, the public interest to the extent it may be
14
applicable.

The Court went on to find that in any event, the information sought
by the CLA was not necessary for meaningful public discussion of the
12
13
14

Id., at paras. 32 and 33.
Id., at paras. 48 and 55.
Id., at para. 56.
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investigation into the murder of Domenic Racco, as there was already
much information in the public domain.15 It also noted that even if necessity were established, the CLA would face a further hurdle of
demonstrating that access would not impinge on the proper functioning
of government.16
Despite these findings, the Court remitted the law enforcement claim
back for reconsideration by the Commissioner on the basis that the volume of the withheld record suggested that the head may not have
disclosed as much as the record as possible, as is required under the
Act.17

IV. ANALYSIS
1. The Meaning of “Meaningful”
The approach of the Court in Criminal Lawyers is not identical to
what was prescribed in Irwin Toy, where the Court summarized the test it
had established under section 2(b) as follows:
When faced with an alleged violation of the guarantee of freedom of
expression, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the
plaintiff’s activity falls within the sphere of conduct protected by the
guarantee. Activity which (1) does not convey or attempt to convey a
meaning, and thus has no content of expression or (2) which conveys a
meaning but through a violent form of expression, is not within the
protected sphere of conduct. If the activity falls within the protected
sphere of conduct, the second step in the analysis is to determine
whether the purpose or effect of the government action in issue was to
restrict freedom of expression. If the government has aimed to control
attempts to convey a meaning either by directly restricting the content
of expression or by restricting a form of expression tied to content, its
purpose trenches upon the guarantee. Where, on the other hand, it aims
only to control the physical consequences of particular conduct, its
purpose does not trench upon the guarantee. In determining whether the
government’s purpose aims simply at harmful physical consequences,
the question becomes: does the mischief consist in the meaning of the
activity or the purported influence that meaning has on the behaviour of
others, or does it consist, rather, only in the direct physical result of the
15
16
17

Id., at para. 59.
Id., at para. 60.
Id., at para. 67.

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION

239

activity. If the government’s purpose was not to restrict free expression,
the plaintiff can still claim that the effect of the government’s action
was to restrict her expression. To make this claim, the plaintiff must at
least identify the meaning being conveyed and how it relates to the
pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self18
fulfillment and human flourishing.

Two things stand out about this summary.
First, the definition of expressive activity is very broad, excluding
only activity that conveys no meaning or violent activity.
Second, the Court in Irwin Toy distinguished between situations
where the purpose of legislation is to restrict freedom of expression, in
which case there is a prima facie breach of section 2(b), and cases where
the purpose is not to limit freedom of expression but the legislation nonetheless has that effect, in which case only where the meaning being
conveyed relates to the values underlying section 2(b) will there be an
infringement. The Court in Criminal Lawyers referenced the purpose/effect distinction in Irwin Toy, but did not explain how it applied in
the access to information context.
It is hard, at first glance, to reconcile the broad approach to section
2(b) endorsed by the Court since Irwin Toy with the statement in Criminal Lawyers that the right to access information is only granted when
necessary for “meaningful discussion” on matters of public interest. The
approach in Criminal Lawyers is also hard to reconcile with general
principles underlying access legislation. It appears that government can
now respond to an access to information request by asking what the information will be used for. This is not a welcome development.
It seems most likely that in using the words “meaningful discussion”,
the Court intended to refer to discussion that advances the freedom of
expression values. This conclusion is based on the fact that in most cases,
legislation that limits access to information will not do so for the purpose
of preventing speech. Rather, it is more likely to be the case that legislation is intended to protect the proper functioning of government but has
the effect of limiting speech. This was precisely the situation before the
Court in Criminal Lawyers, where the alleged limitation on access was
prescribed by exemptions designed to protect communications relating to
law enforcement and solicitor-client communications. Pursuant to Irwin
Toy, where the unintended effect of legislation is to limit speech, the
18
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927,
at para. 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
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party asserting a section 2(b) right must demonstrate that the meaning
being conveyed relates to “the pursuit of truth, participation in the
community, or individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing”.19 As is
illustrated, for example, by the findings of the Supreme Court in Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., a broad range of communications
fit within this category:
The electronically amplified noise at issue here encouraged passers-by
to engage in the leisure activity of attending one of the performances
held at the club. Generally speaking, engaging in lawful leisure
activities promotes such values as individual self-fulfillment and
human flourishing. The disputed value of particular expressions of selffulfillment, like exotic dancing, does not negate this general
proposition: R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at p. 489. It follows that
the By-law has the effect of restricting expression which promotes one
20
of the values underlying s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter.

It is consistent with both Irwin Toy and Criminal Lawyers that
“meaningful discussion” is discussion that promotes the values underlying section 2(b) of the Charter. As City of Montréal illustrates, a broad
variety of expression promotes these values. If broadcasting loud music
to attract club patrons is an activity that promotes section 2(b) values, the
desire to comment on a criminal prosecution necessarily is also. It is
worth noting that although the Court in Criminal Lawyers rejected the
section 2(b) claim, it did not give any indication that the discussion that
the CLA wished to advance was not meaningful.
More troubling, perhaps, for those advocating a broad interpretation
of the Criminal Lawyers decision, is the use of the word “necessary” and,
in particular, the Court’s finding that as similar information was available
through other sources, access was not necessary to foster meaningful discussion. This is, however, a fact-specific finding that appeared to overlap
somewhat in the Court’s reasoning with the fact that the information
sought might impinge on privileges designed to protect the proper functioning of government institutions. It would be a mistake to think that
these findings will be an insurmountable impediment to the future expansion of the scope of the access to information right available under
section 2(b).

19
20

tréal”].

Irwin Toy, id.
[2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 84 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City of Mon-
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2. The Law Develops Incrementally
The Court was cautious in this first foray into recognizing a constitutional right to access government information. It emphasized the
derivative nature of the right and also the fact that the right will not extend so far as to impair the proper functioning of government institutions.
It has nevertheless recognized a derivative right of access, and the importance of this first step should not be understated. Prior to this decision,
the government could have revoked the Act without any remedy being
available under the Charter. This is no longer the case.
There is reason to believe that the scope of the right to access information will expand over time. While the connection between access to
government information and democracy has long been recognized, the
movement towards the recognition of a legal right of access, whether
constitutionally entrenched or otherwise, is a more recent phenomenon.
The provinces implemented freedom of information legislation through
the 1990s and after.21 The federal Access to Information Act was conceived, debated and legislated at nearly the same time as the Charter,
becoming law in June 1982, and taking effect on July 1, 1983.22 Only
since then have courts elaborated on the importance of a right of access23
and accorded access legislation quasi-constitutional status.24 The recognition of a derivative constitutional right of access was a logical next step
in the evolution of this area of the law, as will be, in time, the expansion
of the scope of the right.
21
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1; Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20; Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. (Nu.) 1994, c. 20; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25;
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01; 2000, c. F-25;
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. c. F175; FIPPA, supra, note 6; An
Act respecting Access to Documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal information, R.S.Q., c. A-2.1; Right to Information Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. R-10.3; Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-15.01; Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5; and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L.
2002, c. A-1.1.
22
R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1.
23
Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at
para. 61 (S.C.C.).
24
See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), [2004]
F.C.J. No. 524, 2004 F.C. 431, at para. 20 (F.C.); Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada
(Minister of National Defence), [2008] F.C.J. No. 939, 2008 FC 766, at para. 45 (F.C.); and Lavigne
v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), [2002] S.C.J. No. 55, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 773, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) (considering the Privacy Act, but commenting on the provision in
the Privacy Act granting individuals with a right of access to personal information about themselves).
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The evolution of the law in Canada is mirrored by developments
abroad. According to a worldwide survey conducted in 2006, more than
80 countries had by then adopted constitutional provisions that recognize
a “right to know”.25 Most newly written constitutions include a right to
access, and some older constitutions have recently been amended to include right to access provisions.26
As many countries have recognized the right to access government
information at either the domestic or international level — and in many
cases, both — the international jurisprudence relating to the right to access government information has also developed.
For example, in the case of Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic,27 the European Court of Human Rights considered whether the
Czech government had an obligation to disclose documents and information relating to a proposed nuclear plant. The governmental authority that
had been solicited to provide the documents had resisted the request by
an environmental NGO. The European Court decided that it would not
require the governmental authority to disclose the documents at issue,
noting that the balancing of interests required by the case rendered the
non-disclosure acceptable. However, in considering the utility of article
10 of the ECHR, the Court confirmed that the refusal to disclose the
documents did amount to an interference with the requesting NGO’s
“right to receive information”.28
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”) has more directly recognized a “right to know”. In Claude Reyes and others v.
Chile,29 the IACHR considered whether the Chilean government was
required to disclose information about a proposed government deforestation project. The IACHR held unequivocally that article 13 of the ACHR

25
David Banisar, “Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of
Access to Government Records Law” (Privacy International, 2006), at 17. Available online:
<http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf>.
26
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996, Article 32(1); Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Prom. SG 56/13 Jul 1991, Article 41. Available online:
<http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en>; Constitution of the Republic of Poland, April 2,
1997, Article 61. Available online: <http://www.senat.gov.pl/k5eng/dok/konstytu/konstytu.htm>.;
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007), Part 10. Available online: <http://www.
asianlii.org/th/legis/const/2007/1.html>; Constitution of Finland, June 11, 1999, Section 12. Available online: <http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf>.
27
E.C.H.R. July 10, 2006, Court Application No. 19101/03 [hereinafter “Sdruženi”].
28
Id., at 9.
29
Judgment of September 19, 2006. Available online: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
casos/articulos/seriec_151_ing.pdf>.
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protects the right of all individuals to request access to State-held
information, with the exceptions permitted by the restrictions
established in the convention. Consequently, this article protects the
right of the individual to receive such information and the positive
obligation of the State to provide it, so that the individual may have
access to such information or receive an answer that includes a
justification when, for any reason permitted by the [ACHR], the State is
30
allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific case.

These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. There is, in
short, a worldwide trend towards facilitating access to government information.

V. CONCLUSION
Criminal Lawyers does not define the scope of the derivative right of
access, and the decision adopts what might be characterized as a cautious
approach to this new-found right. However, from the perspective of those
favouring a broad right of access to government information, the glass is
half full. The Supreme Court has set out a framework from which the
scope of access rights can be developed and expanded.

30

Id., at para. 77.

